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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper explores the possibility that unregulated FDI flows are causally implicated in the 
decline in labor productivity growth in semi-industrialized economies. These effects are 
hypothesized to operate through the negative impact of firm mobility on worker bargaining 
power and thus affecting wages. Downward pressure on wages can reduce the pressure on firms 
to raise productivity in defense of profits, contributing to a low wage￿low productivity trap. 
This paper presents empirical evidence, based on panel data fixed effects and GMM estimation 
for 37 semi-industrialized economies, that supports the causal link between increased firm 
mobility and lower wages, as well as slower productivity growth over the period 1970￿2000.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper explores the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows on wages and 
productivity growth in developing economies. Recent debates have focused on the effects of 
inward FDI on aggregate productivity. Inward FDI are assumed to affect productivity directly￿
via the introduction of new technologies, skills and best-practice management techniques, as 
well as frontier capital goods, and indirectly￿through spillover effects to domestic firms.  
Despite the potential positive effects of inward FDI on productivity, there is evidence of a 
global productivity growth slowdown, observable since the 1980s in many developing (and 
developed) economies (Pieper 2000; Singh 2000). Pieper (2000) finds for a set of developing 
economies, for example, that median labor productivity growth slowed from 1.2 percent 
annually from the mid-1970s￿1984 to 0.2 percent in the period 1985￿early 1990s.  
Is there a link between FDI flows and the slowdown in productivity growth in developing 
economies? This paper seeks an answer to that question. In contrast to previous studies that 
focus on inward FDI, I also consider the possibility of negative effects of increases in total FDI, 
measured as the sum of the absolute value of inward and outward FDI on productivity growth, 
via the effect of FDI on wages. These linkages can be explained as follows. The growth of total 
FDI flows serves as an indicator of firm mobility in the context of labor immobility. Firm 
mobility may read by workers as a credible threat that firms are able relocate in the event of 
unacceptably strong wage demands on the part of labor. The increase in firm bargaining power, 
even if not acted on via firm relocation, can lead to slower wage growth. This in turn can reduce 
pressure on firms to innovate or adopt new technologies, leading to slower productivity growth 
than in an era of regulated FDI flows. Indeed, firm mobility, by holding down worker 
bargaining power and wages can make firms ￿lazy,￿ leading to a low wage-low productivity 
trap. 
Increased bargaining power can also allow firms to shift to potentially less efficient but 
more profitable production processes. Evidence of this latter trend is reflected in the growing 
body of literature that documents the increasing reliance on subcontracting, home working, and 
contingent labor arrangements as a way to lower labor costs. Although such labor arrangements 
may permit firms to preserve or enlarge profits, slower labor productivity growth may also 
result.   3  
A plausible hypothesis then is that increases in firm mobility are associated with negative 
effects on wage and productivity growth, a proposition this paper empirically investigates for a 
set of 37 semi-industrialized economies for the period 1970￿2000. Using fixed effects and 
dynamic panel GMM estimation methods, we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. 
Other factors less easily captured empirically, however, may play a role as well, such as 
macroeconomic stabilization policies, liberalization of financial flows, and privatization of 
previously publicly-owned firms. For that reason, detailed case studies would be a valuable next 
step for exploring country-specific factors the role of FDI in influencing trends in wage and 
labor productivity growth.  
 
II. TRENDS IN FIRM MOBILITY 
 
Before tracing the link between FDI, wages, and productivity, it is useful to consider FDI trends 
by region. Although most FDI flows to developed economies, the share of global inward FDI 
going to developing economies has seen a secular increase since 1970 (Figure 1). This trend has 
been variable and, in particular, industrial country recessions lead to abrupt declines in the share 
going to developing economies with a recovery of that share increasing during economic 
upturns. Outflows of FDI from developing economies have also increased due to financial 
market liberalization and the dismantling of the tools of industrial policy, which have made it 
more feasible for domestic firms, especially in semi-industrialized economies, to shift 
investment abroad.  
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These trends are suggestive of an increase in firm mobility which can be measured as total 
FDI￿the sum of absolute value of inward and outward FDI. Total FDI (as compared to inward 
or outward FDI alone) is an indicator of the degree to which firms have an enlarged set of 
choices for relocation in response to local cost conditions.
1 As a result, this variable, measured 
as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, serves as a proxy indicator of capital￿s threat 
effect or fallback position in negotiations over wages, employment taxes, and other factors that 
affect firm profitability. That share in has been rising for most regions of the developing world 
(Figure 2).  
























III. DEBATES ON THE EFFECTS OF FDI 
 
 
FDI is often prized as a means to stimulate growth in developing economies. As a result, there 
has been debate over the determinants of inward FDI as well as the impact of investment 
liberalization on developing economies. These debates are linked, heated, and as yet, 
unresolved. Two broad groups emerge in this debate.  
One group of observers lauds the relaxation of constraints on corporate investment as a 
win-win outcome. MNCs profit from higher rates of return on investment that flexibility offers, 
and receiving countries benefit from employment creation, higher wages that MNCs have been  5  
documented to pay, and productivity growth. Vehicles by which FDI promotes productivity 
growth include technology transfer, embodied in imported inputs or sold directly through 
licensing agreements, and skills and managerial diffusion as MNC employees migrate to 
domestic firms. Spillover effects on domestic firm productivity and economic growth are 
expected to be positive and significant, and there is evidence to support this view (Blomstrőm 
and Persson 1983; Chuang and Lin 1999; Zhu and Lu 1998). These arguments provide a 
tantalizing rationale for deregulation of FDI flows, given the evaporation of foreign aid and the 
instability of portfolio investment. On the basis of these arguments, countries have been enticed 
to grant liberal tax concessions and to make significant infrastructure investments to attract 
foreign capital.  
Benefits may be limited, however, if foreign firms ￿crowd out￿ domestic firms, and if 
MNCs do not adopt frontier technology. Several studies cast doubt on the spillover effect 
argument, finding little evidence of domestic firm productivity growth as a result of inward FDI 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Haddad and Harrison 1993; Braunstein and Epstein 2002). Aitken 
and Harrison (1999), in a micro-level study of Venezuelan firms provide evidence, for example, 
that domestic firms in sectors with more foreign ownership are less productive than firms in 
sectors with a smaller foreign presence.  
Some macro-level studies that consider long-run trends in productivity growth also 
contradict the optimism about the benefits of unregulated FDI (Singh and Zammit 1995). 
Consistent with this view, Pieper (2000) finds cross-country evidence that labor productivity 
growth has slowed for a set of middle income developing economies from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1990s. Pieper notes that the slowdown in manufacturing productivity growth is of 
particular concern, given its role as a leading sector or engine of growth in the development 
process.  
A second school of thought argues that increased FDI flows result in an augmentation of 
corporate power, and can contribute to downward pressure on wages as well as greater wage 
inequality in both developed and developing economies (Crotty, Epstein, and Kelly 1998). 
Blecker (1997) develops a series of heterodox (Kaleckian) models to investigate the 
implications of increased firm mobility. A distinct feature of these models is that workers￿ 
wages can be affected by firms￿ threat to relocate, even if they do not move.  
In one of the earlier studies on threat effects, Brofenbrenner (1997) provides evidence that 
unionization efforts in the U.S. have faltered in the face of threats from U.S. firms to relocate to  6  
Mexico, after the signing of NAFTA. The threat effect was found to be significantly higher in 
￿mobile￿ industries such as communications and labor-intensive manufacturing industries with 
easy entry and exit (e.g., garments, food processing). Further, in only 3 percent of cases did 
firms actually follow through on their threat effect after a union election￿suggesting that 
simply the expansion of corporate power through investment liberalization is sufficient to hold 
down wages.  
Several more recent empirical studies of developed economies also find evidence of a 
negative effect of firm mobility on wages (Choi 2001, 2003; Gopinath and Chen 2003; Harrison 
and McMillan 2004). For Latin America, Paus and Robinson (1998) find evidence that inward 
FDI had a positive effect on wages only for the period 1968-87, and not thereafter. While the 
study refers only to inward FDI, it does suggest that there may be a threshold for the effect of 
firm mobility on bargaining power to register negative effects on wage growth.  
Evidence that this kind of threat (real or actualized) has held down wages is also found in 
the case of Taiwan￿s female-dominated manufacturing industries in the 1980s and 1990s. There, 
liberalized FDI flows in the early 1980s led to an increase in the share of total FDI in 
investment, with econometric evidence pointing to the negative effect of total FDI on female 
wages, contributing to a widening gender wage gap. Conversely, in South Korea, where FDI 
flows continued to be restricted, female wages rose faster than men￿s and the gender wage gap 
narrowed (Seguino 2000).  
Rodrik (1997) posits that the result of increased firm mobility is a flattened labor demand 
curve since firms have more ￿substitutes￿ to domestic labor. Because the labor supply curve has 
not become correspondingly steeper (workers do not have similarly expanded employment 
options), bargaining power has shifted in favor of firms, particularly those in mobile industries. 
 
III. THE LINK BETWEEN FDI, FIRM MOBILITY CAPITAL, AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Debates about the effects of FDI on wages and productivity growth in developing economies 
have rarely intersected although they are plausibly linked.
2 A potential problem is increased 
bargaining power may lead firms to shift to a cost-cutting strategy that emphasizes lower wages 
rather than technology investments. Downward pressure on wages then can lead to slower 
productivity growth. This argument implies that, within some range, an increase in wages can 
have a beneficial effect on productivity growth since it induces firms to adopt new technologies  7  
that save on labor and thus raise profits. Conversely, downward pressure on wages may slow the 
rate of productivity growth.  
The positive effect of wages on productivity growth may have technological limits. Firms 
that reach the technology frontier, for example, may find themselves unable to respond to higher 
wages by adopting new technologies, production processes, or organization that raise labor 
productivity. At that juncture, higher wages translate into permanent increases in unit labor 
costs, resulting in higher prices and a decline in demand and employment. To stimulate 
productivity growth then, wages must be neither too high nor too low, staying within a band in 
which it is feasible for firms to respond by raising productivity. 
Figure 3 portrays this relationship, where b is labor productivity and w is the nominal 
wage. w* is a subsistence wage below which wages cannot biologically fall for sustained 
periods of time. Wages within the range between the vertical thick dotted lines (WMIN  →  
WMAX) have a positive effect on productivity growth via the stimulus for firms to innovate in 
order to restore profitability. The ray along the origin denotes constant unit labor costs (C ).  8  
          The notion that higher wages stimulate productivity growth is an old one. This wage-push 
dynamic reflects the technologically progressive character of capitalism that Marx referred to￿
the drive for profits forces firms toward the technology frontier. Switching to a more 
technology-intensive production process induces a decline in labor costs as labor productivity 
rises￿that is, unit labor costs fall. The reward for investment is higher profits per unit of goods 
sold. Marx did not discuss the conditions under which firms might choose this response over 
others (say, relocating to a lower wage site or simply discontinuing production). Investment is, 
after all, risky and profit realization more uncertain under some conditions than others. For 
example, it is more likely that investments that rely on adoption of a new technology a will be 
undertaken when product demand is relatively stable, and by firms in countries that are not yet 
at the technology frontier. Even if technology limits have been reached, other types of 
investments are imaginable￿in worker skills and in process innovation that depends on 
improved organization, with ￿just in time￿ processes an example. This suggests that the 
relationship between labor productivity and wages is positive over some relevant range of wages 
and, depending on the industry, may be linear, logarithmic, or strictly concave.   
Seguino (1999￿2000) provides empirical evidence of a positive relationship between 
wages, investment, and productivity growth for South Korea in the period 1975-95.  Wages 
provided a stimulus to invest, facilitated by restrictions on foreign direct investment as well as 
the state￿s ability to discipline capital through its control over loanable funds. Firm access to 
subsidized credit and tax reductions was contingent on meeting export and investment targets. 
Achievement of those goals was constrained, however, by state guidelines that permitted wages 
to rise. Firms responded to wage hikes by adopting technological upgrades. This served to keep 
prices low so as to remain competitive in export markets and gain access to tax incentives and 
subsidies, while the social benefit of this industrial strategy was rapid productivity growth. To 
see this, the price equation for manufacturing goods can be written: 
λ τ w P ) 1 ( + =  
where  P is price, τ is the mark-up over unit costs, λ  is the labor coefficient (the inverse of labor 
productivity). Higher wages can either push firms to raise P or, as happened in South Korea, 
profits will be squeezed (τ falls) if firms are to meet export targets. Alternatively, to overcome 
the profit squeeze while maintaining market share (P is constant), firms can invest in order to 
lower λ . In this case, wages lead rather than lag productivity growth.  9  
Marquetti (2004), using cointegration and Granger causality tests, finds evidence that 
causality runs from wages to labor productivity for the U.S. over the period 1869￿1996, and for 
a set of 38 countries in the period 1965￿90. He argues that these results corroborate the 
conception that increases in real wages drive profit-seeking capitalists to raise labor productivity 
as their main weapon to defend their profitability.  Focusing on the effects of wage inequality, 
Rogers and Vernon (2002) determine that inequality in the bottom half of the wage distribution 
has a detrimental effect on productivity performance, perhaps because this provides weak 
incentives for firms to reorganize production when low wages are possible. 
 If then industries are operating within the feasible range for technology or process 
improvements, pressures that slow wage growth can also attenuate productivity growth. The 
growth of corporate bargaining power, insofar as it has a negative effect on wages, can be 
expected to slow capital￿s efforts to raise productivity since the pressure to evade a profit 
squeeze is attenuated.  
Another channel through which mobility can slow wage and productivity growth is 
through firm fragmentation or ￿disintegration.￿ This refers to a production strategy designed to 
reduce costs through downsizing and outsourcing as firms externalize what were once internal 
components of the production process, evident especially in labor-intensive manufacturing and 
communication industries (Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001; Balakrishnan, 2002; Sayeed and 
Balakrishnan 2002).
3 Feenstra (1998) notes though that outsourcing even of intermediate goods 
is increasing.   
Globalization may contribute to this trend insofar as financial liberalization reduces a 
firm￿s time horizon, leading to emphasis of short-term as opposed to long-term profits. Under 
such conditions, shifting production to more vulnerable segments of the workforce with lower 
labor productivity could be preferable to making more long-term technology-intensive 
investments. This might especially be true if firms believe that available technological upgrades 
will reduce their mobility and thus bargaining power.
4  
 Subcontracting frequently implies a shift to informal labor arrangements with workers 
employed on a temporary basis by small peripheral firms, sometimes as industrial home 
workers.
5 Subcontracted workers employed in small establishments are not covered by labor 
regulations such as rules on minimum wages, benefits, or safety standards. The result is that 
flexible workers have less bargaining power, and thus lower wages and fewer benefits than 
formal sector workers.
6   10  
The trend toward informalization is pronounced in manufacturing industries in low and 
middle-income countries. In Latin America, for example, the fastest growing part of the labor 
force is informal or temporary and part-time work, and it now represents 47.9 percent of work in 
urban areas (cited in Bener￿a 2002). Charmes (2000) notes that informal sector work as a 
percentage of non-agricultural work is increasing in all regions of the developing world and is 
even higher in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (63.0 percent and 74.8 percent respectively in 
1999) than Latin America. A notable phenomenon has been the increase of subcontracting in a 
number of Asian economies in the post-crisis period. Although there was evidence of the shift to 
informal employment even before the Asian crisis (Ghosh 2001), many large employers in 
labor-intensive industries have subsequently laid off workers and contracted out work to small 
subcontracting firms as a cost-cutting measure in the post-crisis period (Balakrishnan 2002).   
On net, this strategy can lead to lower labor costs since the larger firms are relieved of 
wage payments during periods of slack demand. Moreover, as Sayeed and Balakrishnan (2002) 
point out, outsourcing allows firms to externalize part of their capital and operational costs. 
Monitoring is carried out by the smaller firms or subcontractors, which may themselves 
subcontract portions of production to home workers who are paid a piece rate and thus self-
monitor.  
These trends may be linked to the growth of firm mobility. Increased corporate bargaining 
power has contributed to a gradual process of deregulation of labor markets, a contraction of the 
welfare state, and a decline in union strength that undermine worker bargaining power. These 
conditions allow firms to reduce reliance on full-time year-round workers with benefits and shift 
production outside the firm to smaller units that rely on flexible labor with cheap wages and 
low-cost monitoring due to reliance on a piece rate system. Further, capital mobility, which is a 
reflection of a cross-border production strategy, can be a factor in the tendency toward firm 
disintegration since it puts not only workers but also firms in competition with low-cost 
producers from other countries, pushing firms to outsource as a production method.
7 
Outsourcing and subcontracting also allow firms or dominant players in buyer-driven 
global commodity chains to circumvent the regulatory environment. Heintz (2003: 11) argues 
that the global commodity chain reflects a flexibility in sourcing decisions that ￿mimics the 
effect of capital mobility, by limiting the scope for subcontractors to raise production costs 
without triggering a loss of economic activity.￿ Firm mobility can thus be a proxy for the 
expansion of the global commodity chain which sets up a highly competitive environment in  11  
which competition among producers in developing countries compete to keep unit labor costs 
low. The tenuousness of contracts, short production runs, as well as thin profit margins to those 
low on the commodity chain lead small firms to compete on the basis of low wages rather than 
productivity-enhancing investments.  
Subcontracting firms are likely to rely on informalization as a way to lower labor costs if 
investments in new technologies are destined to soon become obsolete, if macroeconomic 
conditions and in particular product demand conditions are uncertain, if styles change frequently 
(and thus production is characterized by small batch runs). Each of these contributes to the 
uncertainty that a firm may not realize the full benefits of its investment before the equipment 
becomes obsolete, thus slowing the adoption of new technologies that raise productivity.  
Further, increased reliance on informal work arrangements has led to negative effects on skills, 
workers￿ commitment to employers, and increased job turnover (Cappelli 1999). 
 ￿ la Marglin (1974), while profitable, this corporate strategy may not be efficient. Capital 
mobility empowers firms to cut a new deal with workers that cuts costs by lowering wages and 
reducing overhead and monitoring costs. As long as these costs fall more than productivity, unit 
labor costs decrease, making this a profit-maximizing strategy by firms. In this scenario, capital 
mobility can be seen as leading to a trap￿capital mobility holds down wage growth, reducing 
the pressure on firms to raise productivity and, as a result, productivity growth stagnates.   
 
IV. THE TRAP: MOBILITY-REPRESSED PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 
We can think of firm mobility as a bargaining power variable, one that, when increased, leads to 
a decline in wage and therefore productivity growth. The decline in productivity occurs either 
because firms face less pressure to make productivity-enhancing investments or because 
deregulation of FDI allows firms to adopt a strategy to lower wage costs by outsourcing. Firm 
disintegration can lower productivity because production occurs in smaller units with fewer 
resources to upgrade. 
To consider this dynamic more formally, we develop here the framework for estimating 
the effect of firm mobility on wages and then on productivity growth. Changes in wages may be 
the result of supply or demand shifts, as well as structural factors that influence employer 
bargaining power. Conventional labor demand and supply curves provide the framework for  12  
deriving a wage determination equation. Writing a labor demand function in first differences 
yields:  
                                         dD adW dN + − =                                                    (1) 
where N and W are employment and wages respectively measured in natural logarithms, D is a 
vector of exogenous variables that shift demand for labor, d is the difference operator, and α is 
the elasticity of labor demand. Similarly, labor supply is 
                                                          dS edW dN + =                                                    (2)   
 where S is vector of exogenous variables that shift labor supply, and e is the elasticity of labor 
supply with respect to wages.  Solving these equations simultaneously for  
dW yields:  








                    (3) 
Incorporating the role that bargaining power plays in wage determination, a reduced form 
expression for wage determination is: 
      ) , , ( ζ dS dD dW =                                         (3￿)  
where ζ represents employer bargaining power, such as firm mobility.  
Productivity growth can be specified as a Kaldorian technical progress function where 
manufacturing labor productivity growth is a positive function of the rate of growth of capital 
insofar as it embodies new technology.
8 Following Verdoorn￿s Law, we also posit a close 
positive relationship between growth of manufacturing productivity and output, capturing the 
effect of economies of scale and capacity utilization on productivity. Productivity growth then 
can be expressed as:  
                                               u g b o 3 1 ￿ φ φ φ + + =                     (4) 
where b ￿ is the growth rate of labor productivity,φ ois autonomous technical progress, g is the 
growth rate of the capital stock (K), and u the growth rate of output. Independent variables exert 
a positive effect on productivity growth.  
The growth rate of the capital stock can be specified, following the previous discussion, as 
an increasing function of wages and output growth (the accelerator effect): 
                         u g W g g g K I o 2 1 / + + = =                                      (5) 
                                           13  
where I = dK/K, and g 0 is animal spirits, that is, exogenous factors influencing the growth of 
the capital stock. 
Productivity growth then is a function of wages and output, via the effect on the rate of 
growth of the capital stock, and output growth also has an independent effect on productivity 
growth through scale and capacity utilization effects: 
                          u u W g b o 2 1 ) , ( ￿ φ φ φ + + =                 (4￿) 
and from (3) and (4),  () 0 ) , ( ’ ￿ > u W b ζ  and () . 0 ) , ( ’ ’ ￿ < u W b ζ
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We can use this information to graphically depict the low-wage low-productivity trap, 
shown in Figure 4. Productivity growth rises with wages, holding u constant. This is a non-
linear function, indicating that while higher wages can stimulate investment that raises 
productivity, technology gains may at some point be exhausted, at which juncture higher wages 
have a smaller and eventually (though not shown here) negative effect on investment and thus 
productivity growth. This non-linearity gives rise to multiple equilibria as is shown by plotting 








C , in b x W space, based on an expression for the growth of 
unit labor costs:
 10 
                                              b W C ￿ ￿ − =
)
             (6) 
where C ￿  is the growth rate of unit labor costs, which depends positively on the growth rate of 
wages and negatively on the growth rate of labor productivity. This relationship is reflected in 
the ray from the origin along which wage and productivity growth are equal, and thus unit labor 
costs are constant.  14  
     
 
 
As in Figure 3, the point W* reflects a subsistence wage below which wages cannot 
biologically fall, (or, alternatively, it may reflect the mandatory minimum wage). Note that the 
two equilibria reflect identical unit labor costs. The phase paths indicate that the equilibrium at 
the higher level of wages and productivity is a saddle point.
11  
Starting from that point, any downward pressure on wages (due to, say, pressures of 
globalization to reduce wages or make jobs more flexible) will result in a new equilibrium at a 
lower level of wages and productivity, which is stable node. Once wages and productivity have 
fallen to the lower level, there are no endogenous forces that could move them back to their 
higher level. That is, unless there is an exogenous shift in some variable that would raise wages 
from W1 to W2, wages do not rise and there is thus no pressure on firms to innovate. 
  
  15  
V. DOES MOBILITY AFFECT WAGES? EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
 
As the preceding analysis implies, factors that reduce worker bargaining power vis-￿-vis 
capitalists can lower wages and, as a consequence, slow productivity growth. I explore these 
relationships by testing the hypothesis of a negative effect of capital mobility on wages in this 
section, followed by a test of the effect of firm mobility on manufacturing labor productivity 
growth in Section VI. Analyses rely on panel data for 37 semi-industrialized economies (see 
Table A.1 in the appendix for the country sample and Table A.2 for the variable names, 
abbreviations, and sources) for the period 1970￿2000. Such countries should have ample room 
to react to wage increases by adopting new technologies but are also increasingly exposed to the 
downward pressure on wages of increasing firm mobility. Should mobility have a negative 
effect on wages and productivity, it is likely to be more pronounced in labor-intensive industries 
where  wage costs are a larger share of total costs. I test this hypothesis by comparing the effect 
of firm mobility on sectoral (manufacturing) productivity to its effect on several important 
labor-intensive industries￿wearing apparel, footwear, leather and electrical machinery.
12  
 
Empirical Specification: Firm Mobility and Wages 
Based on equation (3￿), the following empirical wage model is estimated  
 
it it it it it it o it FDI dSED GDPD LF d dP W d υ γ γ γ γ γ γ + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln .      (7) 
 
where dlnWit  is the change in log average wages paid in country i at time t. dP is the rate of 
inflation; LF is labor force; and GDPD is the logarithmic deviation of GDP from trend (to 
capture shifts in labor demand and unemployment),
13 SED is the proportion of the population 
with a secondary education (to capture changes in worker productivity), and FDI is foreign 
direct investment as a share of gross fixed capital formation, measured alternatively as total FDI 
and disaggregated into inward and outward FDI. The error term υit has three components: 
υ it = ￿ i + ψ t + ε it ,  
respectively, country-specific and time effects and a normally distributed error term. 
  To account for the country and time specific effects in the error term, equation (7) is 
estimated as a fixed effects model with a time trend. Estimation of this equation raises some 
econometric problems. For example, wage growth can contribute to deviations in GDP from its  16  
long-run trend and thus GDPD may be endogenous. One solution is to use a generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) in which lagged levels of 
the dependent variable and lagged independent variables are employed as instruments. Inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable is beneficial since it can control to a large extent for omitted 
variables. Dynamic panel estimators, however, raise concerns especially for small samples 
(Kiviet 1995). Given this, the results reported below are for both techniques to test for 
robustness of the findings.     
  
Data 
Wages are calculated from UNIDO￿s Industrial Statistics Database which gives data on total 
wages and employees by 3-digit ISIC industry. The data are thus annual average worker 
earnings. This represents a weakness in the data since hours of work are not accounted for with 
the result that wages per hour may differ from annual earnings. The data for size of the labor 
force, female share of the labor force, prices, and GDP are largely self-explanatory. No data on 
percentage of the population with a secondary education exist solely for the manufacturing 
sector, hence the average share of population 15 and over with a secondary education is used.
14   
Firm mobility is measured as total FDI (or inward and outward FDI), using UNCTAD￿s 
database.
15 It is useful to be clear about what this variable does and does not measure. For 
purposes of data categorization, FDI is defined as the increase in the equity position of a foreign 
firm that holds more than 10 percent of the shares of a host country firm. There are several 
important measurement concerns with these data. The first is that FDI data lump together 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and ￿greenfield￿ investment. Thus, FDI may represent either 
purchase of an existing company (mergers and acquisitions) or greenfield investment (new 
factory.) While mergers and acquisitions represent a transfer of existing assets, greenfield FDI 
involves making new capital assets available to the host country firm. There has been a surge in 
M&A, especially in the late 1990s, much of which has gone to purchase public enterprises in the 
case of Latin America. If FDI data are used to capture the effect of new investments, results may 
be ambiguous due to the ￿noise￿ created by the inclusion of M&A. However, this may not pose 
a problem for this study since increases in M&A, almost always publicly announced and 
reflecting increased foreign control of domestic firms, can affect workers￿ perceptions of their 
bargaining power.   17  
  Of greater concern is the possible mismeasurement of FDI in countries that are tax 
havens￿that is, countries that offer an environment conducive to individuals and corporations 
seeking to hide their assets and business activities from government authorities of their home 
countries. Taking this into account, to test for robustness, regressions are run on the full sample 
and for a reduced sample of countries which excludes those identified by the OECD (2000) as 
tax havens￿Barbados, Cyprus, Jamaica, and Mauritius.
16 
  A word of caution about cross-country data analyses is in order. As anyone who has 
worked with cross-country data knows (particularly for developing countries where  resources 
for data collection are constrained), at best the empirical results are suggestive. Heavy reliance 
on the size of coefficients is ill-advised. However, panel data analysis where presumably data 
collection methodologies are consistent over time within countries can be informative, 
especially if the results are robust to alternative specification and estimation methods.  
 
Econometric Results from Wage Regressions 
The results from the fixed effects (FE)
17 and GMM models are presented in Table 1 for the 
manufacturing sector, and in Tables 2 and 3 for four 3-digit manufacturing sub-sectors. The 
dependent variable is nominal wage growth. Regression results are reported with capital 
mobility measured as total FDI, and then disaggregated into inward and outward FDI. The 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is 
used, where lagged levels of the dependent variable and lags of the independent variables are 
used as instruments for the equation in first differences. Lagged values (t-2) are used as 
instruments for the deviations from GDP trend growth, which is assumed to be endogenous, are 
also used.    
In the manufacturing sector as a whole (Table 1), equations 1-4 give the results from the 
full sample. The effect of log deviations of GDP from its trend on nominal wage growth is not 
significant. Increases in the share of the population with secondary education do not have a 
significant effect on wage growth except in GMM estimations for the full sample, and here the 
sign is unexpectedly negative. This is not surprising and reflects the difficulty noted in the 
literature of establishing a consistent significant positive effect of education on macroeconomic 
outcomes. Also, if other factors not captured in the model lower worker bargaining power, 
improvement in education may not translate into higher wages. Inflation has a positive and 
significant effect on wage growth in all cases. Labor force growth exerts a negative effect on  18  
wages, indicating that expansion of the labor pool held down wage growth. The coefficient is 
significant only in the case of the GMM regressions.  
The coefficients on total FDI are negative and significant in all regressions, but the size of 
the coefficient is twice as large in the GMM model as in the FE model. Disaggregating total FDI 
into inward and outward FDI shows that each has a significant negative effect on wage growth, 
but the size of the effect of outward FDI  is larger than inward FDI. Wald 
2 χ tests on the sum of 
the FDI coefficients are significant at 1 percent level in all regressions (the null hypothesis that 
the sum of the coefficients is equal to zero is rejected).  Further, again we see that the 
coefficients on the FDI variables are larger in the GMM estimations.  
The larger coefficient on outward FDI is to be expected if workers interpret the outflow of 
investment as a threat to the security of employment and therefore attenuate wage demands 
(although we will see that in other regressions, inward FDI has a stronger negative effect on 
wages in sub-industries). The fact that both inward and outward FDI are statistically significant 
suggests they exert independent effects on wages. The positive coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is in line with other empirical studies of dynamic wage equations.   
Equations 5-8 give the results for the reduced sample. The estimated coefficients on FDI 
are similar in size and significance to those in the full sample, suggesting that the results in 
equation 1-4 are not driven by inclusion of tax havens in the sample. Coefficients on remaining 
independent variables are also quite similar to the full sample results. 
To consider the possibility that the results are being driven by omitted variables correlated 
with wage growth, the regressions in Table 1 were re-estimated adding female share of the labor 
force as an explanatory variable. An argument for inclusion of this variable is that female 
workers have less bargaining power than men, and their increased participation in paid labor can 
depress wage growth. In most cases (results not reported here), the coefficient on this variable is 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. 20  
  
Table 2 gives results from the full sample for four labor-intensive manufacturing 
industries. Firms in these industries are likely to be more mobile than firms in more capital-
intensive industries due to fewer sunk costs and firm investments in training. As a result, the 
threat effect may be larger in such industries. It is empirically challenging to detect these effects, 
however, because FDI data are not available at the 3-digit industry level.  
Nevertheless, the results indicate that FDI exerts a negative effect in three of these sub-
sectors￿wearing apparel, footwear, and leather￿but there is no discernible effect in the 
electrical machinery industry, except of outward FDI in the FE model. The strongest negative 
effects are in the wearing apparel industry, where the coefficient on total and disaggregated FDI 
is significantly negative and comparable in size to those in the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
The results from the reduced sample (Table 3) indicate that the negative effect of firm mobility 
on wages in wearing apparel are also apparent to varying extents in footwear, leather, and 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  25  
 
These results are consistent with the proposed argument that changes in firm mobility 
produce psychological effects on workers that cause them to attenuate wage demands. This 
effect may in fact swamp the potentially positive pressure of tight labor markets on wages. The 
￿traumatized worker￿ effect noted by Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank Alan Greenspan in the 
late 1990s that held down wage growth in the U.S. appears to be in evidence in a number of 
countries.
18   
 
VI. CAPITAL MOBILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The negative effect of firm mobility on wages is hypothesized to reverberate on productivity 
growth. To examine directly the relationship between foreign direct investment and labor 
productivity growth, we estimate the following equation:  
                                        it it it it u FDI b d υ β β β + + + = 2 1 0 ln                  (8) 
 
where dlnb is the growth rate of labor productivity,  o β is exogenous technical progress when 
independent variables are measured at their mean, u is aggregate demand, captured by growth 
rate of GDP, and it υ again has three components￿country-specific and time effects, and a 
normally distributed error term. 
A FE estimator is used on equation (8). However, due to the possible endogeneity of the 
growth rate of GDP, a GMM dynamic panel estimator which removes fixed effects by first 
differencing the data is also employed. A further benefit of the GMM estimator is that it permits 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side to capture omitted variable 
effects. Instruments are lags of the dependent variables and GDP growth and firm mobility.  
Measurement and data issues were discussed in the previous section with the exception 
of labor productivity. Labor productivity is measured as annual valued-added of output in 
constant terms relative to employment. Raw data for these variables were obtained from the 
UNIDO 2002 Industrial Statistics Database. It would have been preferable to have data on 
annual hours worked, rather than merely the number of workers. This would have allowed us to 
calculate labor productivity per hour, rather than on an annual basis. In that sense, these results 
should be viewed cautiously.   26  
Econometric Results 
The first two columns in Table 4 show the FE results for the full sample. GDP growth exerts a 
positive and significant effect on productivity growth, consistent with the Verdoorn hypothesis. 
Total FDI has a negative effect on productivity growth, significant at the 10 percent level, while 
FDI disaggregated into inward and outward FDI have opposite signs and are not statistically 
significant. The adjusted R
2s are quite low, especially as compared to the wage regressions, 
which may be explained by the substantial variation in year-to-year productivity growth rates.  
Columns 3 and 4 show the full sample GMM results. Coefficients on GDP and total FDI 
are significant (although only at the 10 percent level for FDI) and larger than in the FE models. 
In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in total FDI leads to 0.158 percentage point decline 
in productivity growth, while GDP growth increases of 1 percentage point are associated with a 
0.635 point increase in the productivity growth rate. Inward FDI exerts a significantly negative 
effect on productivity growth while outward FDI, though negative, is not significant. 
Nevertheless, a Wald test on the sum of the coefficients on inward and outward FDI holds at the 
10% level. Notably, the sum of these coefficients is similar in magnitude to that on total FDI. 
Results from the reduced sample (columns 5-8) are similar, but the coefficients on outward FDI 
are not significant and the inward FDI effect is negative and significant in the GMM estimation.  
Table 5 provides full and reduced results for sub-sectors (with total FDI only). The 
negative effect of FDI on productivity growth is evident in wearing apparel, footwear, and 
leather. Significance varies by estimation method with FDI exhibiting a more consistently 
significant negative effect in the GMM estimations. It should be recalled, however, that while 
the GMM estimates include a lagged dependent variable that captures effects of omitted 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































_ 30  
Exploring the low explanatory power of the FE models, I estimated the fixed effects 
model, allowing for country-specific intercepts on the mobility terms which permits the effect of 
total FDI on productivity growth to vary by country. This does not improve the explanatory 
power of these models. In another set of FE regressions (not reported here), I incorporated a 
dummy on Asian economies interacted with the mobility variable to test whether the effects of 
FDI on productivity differ substantially from other countries in the sample due to efforts to link 
FDI to industrial strategies. The coefficient on the interaction term was positive, but not 
significant.  
In sum, in most cases, the coefficient on FDI is negative, even if not significant. Statistical 
significance is most consistent in wage regressions, especially at the manufacturing sector level 
in both the full and reduced samples. The negative effect of FDI on productivity is also in 
evidence at the manufacturing sector level with both FE and GMM estimation methods. GMM 
results indicate that the effect of FDI on productivity growth in sub-industries is negative, with 
FE method producing much weaker evidence of such an effect.  
While the results are consistent with the hypothesis of a low wage-low productivity trap, 
we might want to be cautious due to measurement problems and the possibility of omitted 
variable bias in the FE regressions. For example, while we control for that portion of investment 
induced by wages, we do not have a variable that measures ￿animal spirits￿ from equation (5) 
above. This works in the opposite direction of the mobility variable on labor productivity, 
however, and thus it is not likely that the mobility variable is capturing the effect of that omitted 
variable.  
Another concern is that the FDI data are ￿noisy￿ at the sub-sector level in that they do not 
allow us to separate out vertical from horizontal FDI. It would have been useful to do so, since it 
is likely that the threat effect of FDI on wages is more palpable in industries engaged in vertical 
FDI. Since these are largely export industries, they tend to be even more sensitive to wage 
increases than industries with a high degree of horizontal FDI. Horizontal FDI, more frequent in 
capital-intensive industries, is propelled by the desire to gain access to domestic markets for 
which trade access might be restricted. In such industries (e.g., autos in China), entry and exit is 
more costly and time-consuming and so mobility is reduced. Even apart from factor intensity of 
production, these firms are not likely to respond so negatively to higher wages since presence in 
the domestic economy is essential for sales. With regard to empirical analysis, of course, this is 
a moot point, since we don￿t have data to separate out the two types of FDI.   31  
The noisiness of the data relates also to the inclusion of merger and acquisition data in 
FDI, although that is not so much of a problem as it may seem. Here we are not trying to 
measure the impact of gross fixed capital formation per se but rather the power of firms to 
respond to negative profit conditions in local economies, and the arresting effect of that power 
on wages. Nevertheless, given these results, it is more prudent to surmise simple associations 
between FDI, wages, and productivity rather than any stronger conclusions.  
Table 6 summarizes the results from the wage and productivity regressions for the 
manufacturing sector, focusing on the effects of FDI on each of these variables. The negative 
effects of FDI are most robust on wages, and in the disaggregated regressions, outward FDI has 
a more significant negative effect than inward FDI as might be expected. FDI also exerts a 
negative effect on productivity growth, although here the coefficients on total FDI are 
significant only at the 10 percent level, while in the disaggregated regressions using GMM 
estimation, inward FDI exhibits a negative significant effect on productivity. These results are 
robust to the sample used.  
Despite the consistency of these results, it is possible that FDI is proxying for other factors 
that are causing a downward pressure on wages and productivity. Contemporaneous macro-level 
policies, such as widespread privatization may be at fault. Increased uncertainty and volatility 
associated with financial liberalization may also be at play. In the case of productivity growth, 
because technological transformation is more complex than suggested here, the inclusion of 
additional variables such as spending on R&D would be necessary for greater confidence in 
these results. The paucity of data on such variables limits the extent to which cross-country 
analysis can be used to explore these issues. For that reason, detailed case studies of particular 
countries and industries would be valuable for exploring these empirical issues.    32  
Table 6. Summary of FDI Effects on Wage and Labor Productivity Growth:  















The benefits of liberalization have been touted and, in particular, the host country rewards of 
liberalized investment have been advanced as a powerful reason for governments to create 
conditions amenable to foreign capital such as flexible labor. To date, some studies have 
provided evidence, albeit inconclusive, that inward FDI might promote productivity growth 
since foreign firms bring with them later vintage technology which can spillover to promote 
productivity growth in the rest of the economy. But liberalization also brings with it increased 
firm bargaining power. That increased power could limit wage growth, attenuating the 
salutatory pressure that higher wages put on firms to innovate and increase efficiency that can 
restore profits.  
There is thus a potentially positive dynamic between wages and productivity growth: 
within some band, we can expect higher wages to push firms to innovate and increase 
productivity. If capital mobility reduces wage pressures, however, the push for firms to innovate 
also declines, leading to slower productivity growth.  
The evidence presented here is consistent with that hypothesized dynamic and suggests 
that investment liberalization, instead of raising living standards, could lead to slower wage 
growth. The evidence provided also shows evidence of a negative effect of FDI on 
manufacturing productivity growth. Pieper￿s (2000) finding that negative productivity growth 












Full Sample   
Total FDI  ￿*** ￿****  ￿*  ￿* 
Inward FDI  ￿ ￿*  ￿ ￿*** 
Outward FDI
  ￿**** ￿***  ￿  ￿ 
Reduced Sample   
Total FDI  ￿*** ￿*** ￿*  ￿* 
Inward FDI
  ￿** ￿***  ￿  ￿** 
Outward FDI  ￿*** ￿*** ￿  ￿  33  
rates in the industrial sector are strongly associated with negative productivity growth rates in 
the economy as a whole, suggests that the determinants of productivity growth rates in this 
sector are of great concern for economy-wide well-being.  
To the extent FDI has a negative effect on wages and productivity, they are not meant to 
be an indictment of FDI or to imply that it has unambiguously negative effects for semi-
industrialized economies. The results suggest, however, that there can be a low wage-low 
productivity trap that countries can fall into, should capital gain too much bargaining power vis-
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NOTES 
                                                
1 This variable is not, however, an accurate measure of resources available for gross fixed capital 
formation. This is because FDI flows are measured as the sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings, and 
loans from the parent company to the host country affiliate, in firms in which the parent company owns a 
share in excess of 10 percent. In fact, FDI is actually a source of corporate finance, rather than a specific 
use of that finance, and thus does not necessarily imply expenditure on fixed assets. 
 
2 An exception is Barry, Gőrg, and Strobl (2001) who investigate the effect of FDI on wages and 
productivity in Ireland. They find a negative effect on wages and productivity but only for domestic 
exporters, with no effect on non-exporting firms.  
  
3 Feenstra (1998) provides evidence of the simultaneous integration of goods markets through trade 
liberalization and disintegration of production as manufacturing and services activities carried out in 
developed economies are combined with those performed in developing economies.  
 
4 I am indebted to James Heintz for this point. 
 
5 Standing (1989) refers to this process as ￿global feminization￿ whereby jobs have become increasingly 
flexible￿lacking in job stability or security and with little possibility for promotion. Gender plays a role 
since women are more likely to be inducted into the flexible slots. Whether it is because they have less 
bargaining power than men or because their aspiration wages are lower due to socialization of inferior 
status, they are arguably less likely to resist low wages and poor work conditions.  
 
  
6 See Roh (1990) and Carr, Chen, and Tate (2000) for comparisons of wages of home-based or informal 
sector workers and formal sector workers. For the U.S., see, for example, McCrate (2003).  
 
7 This is not just a developing country phenomenon. Sweatshops in the garment industry have been on 
the rise in both the U.S. and Britain in recent years, for example (Fernandez-Kelley and Sassen 1993; 
Kabeer 2000).  
 
8 Kaldor (1966), it will be recalled, posited the existence of a "technical progress" function whereby the 
rate of growth of capital positively affects rate of growth of labor productivity (albeit at a diminishing 
rate), because of embodied technical progress.  
 
9 This may be considered a special case of the more general relationship between wages and 
productivity, since the positive effect of wages on investment and thus productivity only holds over some 
range in which new technologies are available for adoption. As a result, the derivative could be positive 
or negative, based on structural conditions in the economy. At some point wages will be too high to 
stimulate investment, due to more profitable outside options or the unavailability of technological 
innovations that raise productivity.  (Otherwise, the assumption of a strictly positive effect of wages on 
productivity would imply a stagnationist or wage-led macroeconomy. I am grateful to an anonymous 
referee for this point).  
 
10 A more complete equation for unit labor costs would include a measure of monitoring costs, overhead 
distributed per unit of goods, and other benefits. We simplify in this analysis, but in other contexts, it 
may be useful to expand unit labor costs to include these additional variables.  
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11 Formally, considering the Jacobian matrix of the system (4) and (6), local stability requires a positive 
determinant or ( 0 1 2 > − w u b k b k ) where  2 1,k k  are reaction coefficients. Holding u constant, this 
implies that bw must be positive. The saddle point occurs when b
)




12 Electrical machinery includes assembly of consumer electronics, but this industry produces more 
sophisticated goods. As a result, over time, the industry has become less labor-intensive, particularly in 
some of the higher income semi-industrialized economies such as South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
13 Unemployment data are missing for many countries in this sample, and for that reason, GDPD is used 
as a proxy.  A positive deviation from trend implies a fall in unemployment that should result in upward 
pressure on wages.  
  
14 Growth in average years of educational attainment was also used, with similar results, although more 
frequently, this variable was insignificant. 
  
15 Many studies use IMF FDI data but there were significantly more missing observations in that data set 
for which reason I relied on the UNCTAD data. 
 
16 Hong Kong￿s FDI data is also suspect, but for a different reason. A substantial amount of FDI recorded 
for Hong Kong is diverted to China. To test for the robustness of the results, Hong Kong was excluded 
from the sub-sample in a set of regressions (not reported here), and the results were broadly similar to 
those obtained from the reduced samples.  
 
17 In FE regressions, country-specific fixed effects are omitted for convenience. 
18 Greenspan made this observation in response to the observation that while the U.S. economy grew 
rapidly in the 1990s and unemployment fell, wages were rising very slowly. This has led to a rethinking 
of the so-called natural rate of unemployment concept, or at a minimum, has led to downward revisions 














Table A.1 Sample  
 
Region Countries  covered 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Cameroon, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa 
Mediterranean  Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey 
Latin America and Caribbean  Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela 
South and East Asia  China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Rep. of Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan 
Note: FDI data for those countries in bold italicized print are reported to suffer from distortions￿either because of 
evidence the country serves as a tax haven, or because FDI funds are recorded there, but destined for another 
country (Hong Kong). For that reason, a reduced sample is used in the econometric analyses, with those countries 
omitted from that sample. 
 
 
Table A.2 Variable List and Data Sources 
 




Productivity Growth (for manufacturing and 
selected sub-industries) 
UNIDO (INDSTAT 3, 2003). (calculated 
from data on value added and no. of 
employees by author) 
FDI  Total (and inward and outward) FDI as % 
gross fixed capital formation   
UNCTAD Division on Investment, 
Technology, and Enterprise 
Development￿s FDI data and UNIDO 
(INDSTAT 3, 2003). for gross fixed 
capital formation.  
FSHLF  Female share of labor force  World Development Indicators 
GDPD  Logarithmic deviations of GDP from trend  GDP data from World Development 
Indicators. (Logarithmic deviations are 
author￿s calculations) 
LF  Labor force growth  World Development Indicators 
P  GDP deflator  World Development Indicators 
SED  Share of population 15+ having completed 
secondary education 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
U   Growth rate GDP  World Development Indicators 
W  Average sector wage  UNIDO  (INDSTAT 3, 2003 and 2004). 
 
 
 
  